The costs of remoteness: evidence from German division and reunification by Redding, Stephen & Sturm, Daniel M.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Costs of Remoteness: Evidence from German Division and 
Reunification 
 
Stephen Redding 
London School of Economics and CEPR 
 
Daniel M. Sturm 
University of Munich and CEPR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
Political Economy and Public Policy Series 
The Suntory Centre 
Suntory and Toyota International Centres for  
Economics and Related Disciplines 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
PEPP/11 
July  2005     Tel:  (020) 7955 6674 
 
 
©  The author.  All rights reserved.  Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be 
quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source 
The Costs of Remoteness: Evidence from German Division and
Reunification∗
Stephen Redding†
London School of Economics and CEPR
Daniel M. Sturm‡
University of Munich and CEPR
March 2005
Abstract
This paper exploits the division of Germany after the Second World War and the re-
unification of East and West Germany in 1990 as a natural experiment to provide evidence
of the importance of market access for economic development. In line with a standard new
economic geography model, we find that following division cities in West Germany that were
close to the new border between East and West Germany experienced a substantial decline in
population growth relative to other West German cities. We provide several pieces of evidence
that the decline of the border cities can be entirely accounted for by their loss in market access
and is neither driven by diﬀerences in industrial structure nor diﬀerences in the degree of war
related destruction. Finally, we also find some first evidence of a recovery of the border cities
after the re-unification of East and West Germany.
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1. Introduction
One of the most striking empirical regularities is the huge divergence in economic
activity and income across space. At least three, not mutually exclusive, explanations
for this fact have been proposed. First, an influential view is that diﬀerences in in-
stitutions, such as the protection of private property, can explain a large part of the
diﬀerences in economic performance. Second, an alternative view is that diﬀerences
in natural endowments, such as climatic conditions and the disease environment, are
the fundamental causes of growth. Third, the new economic geography literature em-
phasizes the importance of market access in determining spatial variation in economic
activity.
While each of these explanations is intuitively plausible, it is diﬃcult to disen-
tangle them empirically. For example, if we observe a number of contiguous regions
prospering, it might be because they have good access to one anothers’ markets, which
reduces the costs to firms of supplying customers and raises the availability of goods to
consumers. However, it might instead be due to these regions sharing common good
institutions or having similar favorable natural endowments. In order to be able to
distinguish these explanations, we need exogenous variation along at least one of these
dimensions.
This paper exploits the division of Germany after the Second World War and the
reunification of East and West Germany in 1990 as a natural experiment to provide
evidence for the importance of market access for economic development. The new
border between East and West Germany separated areas that had been part of the
same state since 1871 and had been highly integrated for several centuries. The drawing
of the border was motivated by military considerations and was based on allocating
occupation zones of roughly equal population to the American, British and Russian
armies. With the collapse of the wartime alliance between the Western Powers and
Russia, the zones of occupation became the nucleus for the foundation of an East and
West German state. With the adoption of central planning in East Germany in 1949
and the construction of extensive border fortifications from 1952 onwards, all local
interaction across the border came to a close.
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As a result of the division of Germany, West German regions close to the new
border experienced a disproportionate loss of market access. This is because these
border regions lost nearby trading partners with whom they could previously interact
at low transport costs. In contrast, the eﬀect on West German regions further from
the border was more muted because they previously had higher transport costs to the
trading partners lost.
To guide our empirical investigation we develop a simple economic geography model
based on Helpman (1998). The model formalizes the role of market access in shaping
the distribution of population across space. Increasing returns to scale and transport
costs provide a force for agglomeration, while an immobile resource introduces a con-
gestion force which favours dispersion. We calibrate the model to city-level data for
Germany in 1939 and simulate the impact of post-war division on the equilibrium dis-
tribution of population across West German cities.1 The main prediction of the model
is that the larger loss of market access for cities close to the new border will lead to a
reallocation of population away from those cities to other West German cities.
We test this prediction using a rich panel of data on West German cities over
the period 1919-2002. Our basic empirical finding is that after division West German
cities close to the new border between East and West Germany experience a marked
decline in population growth relative to other West German cities. Over the 40 year
period of division, we estimate a decline in the annualized rate of population growth
of 0.75 percentage points, implying a cumulative reduction in the size of border cities
relative to other West German cities of around one third. The diﬀerence in population
growth rates for the two groups of cities is not apparent prior to division but emerges
in its immediate aftermath. The estimated eﬀect is strongest in the 1950s and 1960s
and declines over time, consistent with gradual adjustment towards a new long-run
equilibrium distribution of population.
This pattern of results does not have a simple explanation in terms of natural
endowments, which remain unchanged over time, or in terms of institutions, which are
the same across West German cities. Nonetheless, while suggestive of the importance
1Throughout the paper, the phrases “pre-war” or “post-war” relate to the Second World War unless
otherwise indicated.
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of market access, the observed decline in the border cities is also potentially consistent
with other explanations. First, cities close to the new border could have specialized in
industries that experienced a secular decline in the post-war period. Second, the border
cities could have suﬀered a disproportionate amount of war-related damage, which may
have hindered their post-war development. Finally, people may have moved away from
the border out of a belief that these cities would be particularly vulnerable in case of
a new armed conflict in Western Europe.
To exclude these alternative explanations we provide several additional pieces of
evidence. First, we use a measure of market potential, which is a widely employed
empirical proxy for market access, to estimate the loss of market access due to the new
border for each West German city in our dataset. We find that the drop in market
potential caused by the new border can completely explain the diﬀerential growth
performance of the border cities. Second, as suggested by the economic geography
model, we find that the decline of the border cities is not uniform. Smaller cities are
disproportionately aﬀected by the loss of hinterland. Third, we show that parts of the
population which are no longer economically active react less to the imposition of the
border than the economically active population. Finally, we establish that neither the
degree of war-related destruction nor patterns of specialization can explain the relative
decline of the border cities.
The division of Germany appeared to be a permanent feature of the geopolitical
landscape. The reunification of East and West Germany caught most contemporary
observers by surprise and provides an additional source of exogenous variation in mar-
ket access. Relative to division, the reunification of East and West Germany is a much
smaller experiment. East Germany only represents approximately half of the area that
was separated from West Germany after the Second World War (the other half now be-
ing part of Poland and Russia). Additionally, East Germany was economically much
more backward relative to West Germany in 1990 compared to 1939.2 In line with
this, we find a similar pattern of results but on a much smaller scale. We expect that
the recovery of the former border cities will become more substantial as convergence
2See Sinn (2002) for a survey of progress towards convergence between East and West Germany
since re-unification.
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between East and West Germany progresses over the next decades.
Our findings are related to a number of literatures. The view that institutions are
a fundamental source of economic prosperity has been advanced by Acemoglu et al.
(2001), La Porta et al. (1998) and Rodrik et al. (2004) in particular. Others, such
as Bloom and Sachs (1998), Diamond (1997), Gallup et al. (1998) have emphasized
natural endowments including climate, topology and the disease environment. The
importance of market access is formalized in the theoretical literature on new economic
geography, starting with Krugman (1991) and synthesized in Fujita et al. (1999).
There are several empirical studies motivated by theoretical work on economic
geography. Ciccone and Hall (1996) were the first to investigate the link between the
density of economic activity and productivity using U.S. data. Hanson (2005) examines
the relationship between changes in wages and changes in market access across U.S.
counties, while Redding and Venables (2004) analyse the cross-country relationship
between income per capita and distance to markets and sources of supply.
Each of these papers finds a strong correlation between economic performance
and market access. To establish a causal link they also report instrumental variables
estimates. The instruments for market access that are considered include lagged popu-
lation levels or growth rates, lagged transportation infrastructure, the distance of U.S.
counties from the eastern seaboard, or the distance of countries from the United States,
Europe and Japan. The validity of each of these instruments depends on demanding
identification assumptions.
Another line of empirical research has examined how changes in market access
due to trade liberalization aﬀect internal economic geography. Hanson (1996) using
data between 1970 and 1988 finds a negative relationship between relative wages and
distance from Mexico City prior to liberalization in 1985, and presents evidence of
a reorientation of the wage gradient towards the U.S. border in the years 1985-88
following trade liberalization. The key innovation of this paper is that it exploits a
large-scale natural experiment which provides extensive exogenous variation in market
access to shed light on the causal relationship between market access and economic
development.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some histor-
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ical background on the division and reunification of Germany. Section 3 introduces a
simple economic geography model and simulates the impact of the division of Germany.
Section 4 describes our empirical strategy and the data. Section 5 presents our basic
empirical results. Section 6 presents several pieces of evidence that the decline in the
border cities was driven by the loss of market access. Section 7 examines reunification
and the final Section concludes.
2. Historical Background
In the wake of World War II Germany’s boundaries changed dramatically. Map
1 illustrates how pre-war Germany was divided into four diﬀerent parts: West and
East Germany, areas that became part of Poland and finally an area that became
part of Russia. West Germany, which was the largest of these parts, accounted for
approximately 53 percent of the area and just over 58 percent of Germany’s 1939
population of 69.3 million.3 East Germany comprised approximately 23 percent of the
area and 22 percent of the 1939 population of Germany. The areas that became part of
Poland and Russia contained 24 percent of the area of pre-war Germany and accounted
for nearly 14 percent of the 1939 population. East and West Berlin comprised the
remaining 6 percent of the 1939 population. The new border between East and West
Germany cut through some of the most central regions of pre-war Germany that had
been integrated for several centuries.4
The political process leading to the eventual division of pre-war Germany took
several unexpected turns. While a number of proposals to divide Germany after its
eventual defeat were discussed during the early phase of World War II, the United
States and Russia backed oﬀ such plans towards the end of the war (see for example
Franklin 1963, Graml 1985 and Loth 1988). Instead the main planning eﬀort was to
organize the eventual military occupation of Germany. Early on it was decided that
3All figures in this paragraph are taken from the 1952 edition of the “Statistisches Jahrbuch für die
Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” The data on area and 1939 population are based on the 1937 boundaries
of Germany prior to territorial expansion immediately prior to and during the Second World War.
4As a point of comparison the territory of Germany was reduced by just 13 percent, which contained
approximately 10 percent of its population, as part of the peace treaty at the end of World War I
(“Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich” 1921/1922). Furthermore, these areas were small
border regions along the eastern, western and northern edges of Germany.
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the most practical way to proceed would be to allocate separate zones of occupation to
the American, British and Russian armies. The planning process for the zones began
in spring 1943, negotiations continued during 1944, and the protocol formalising the
zones was signed in London in September 1944.
The protocol divided pre-war Germany into zones of roughly equal population,
after excluding the areas that were expected to become part of Poland and Russia.
In line with the location of the advancing armies, the northern part of what would
later become West Germany was to be occupied by British forces, the southern part
of future West Germany was to be controlled by American forces, and the remaining
eastern parts of Germany were to be occupied by the Russian army. Additionally it
was agreed that Berlin would be jointly occupied by Russian, British and American
forces.5 The protocol was modified in 1945 to create a small French zone in the very
South-Western corner of Germany, which was achieved by reducing the size of the
British and American zones of occupation.
As tensions between the Western allies and Russia increased with the onset of the
cold war, the zones of occupation became the nucleus for the foundation of an East
German and a West German state in 1949. The territory of West Germany was the
combined area of the British, French and American zones, and was extended to include
the Saarland from 1957 onwards. East Germany was founded on the Russian zone of
occupation. While the two countries maintained some politically motivated and largely
symbolic economic co-operation, any local economic links between areas on either side
the border were entirely suppressed from 1949 when East Germany introduced central
planning into its economy. From 1952 onwards extensive border fortifications emerged
and the new border between East and West Germany became one of the most sealed
and best guarded in the world.6
5 In early 1944, when the protocol on the occupation zones was negotiated British and American
planners believed that the Russian army was likely to capture most of Germany and viewed the
protocol as a means which would allow them to eventually occupy at least part of Germany (see for
example Sharp 1975). These expectations turned out to be severely mistaken as the American and
British armies captured substantially more of pre-war Germany than their future zones of occupation.
Shortly after the end of hostilities, American and British troops retreated from substantial parts of
East Germany back to the line which had been agreed in the protocol on the zones of occupation in
September 1944.
6Though the main border between East and West Germany was fortified from 1952 onwards, lim-
ited transit between East and West Berlin remained possible until 1961 when the Berlin Wall was
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The division of Germany was formalized in international treaties and was generally
believed to be permanent.7 Increasing dissatisfaction among East Germans about
heavy restrictions on mobility, lack of personal freedom and the declining performance
of the East German economy led to large scale demonstrations in 1989 and culminated
in the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989. In the aftermath of these events,
the East German system rapidly began to disintegrate. Only eleven months later East
and West Germany were formally reunified on 3 October 1990.
3. Theoretical Framework
In this section, we outline a theoretical model of economic geography, based on
Helpman (1998). The model determines the equilibrium distribution of population
across cities in an integrated economy. The main mechanisms of the model are the
combination of increasing returns, transport costs and consumer preferences for variety,
which provide a force for agglomeration. This is combined with an immobile resource
which generates a counteracting force for dispersion.8
We consider the division of a previously integrated market economy into two regions
by the exogenous imposition of a closed border. We examine the implications of the
border for the equilibrium distribution of population across cities. We then calibrate
the model to city populations in pre-war Germany and simulate the eﬀect of the East-
West division on the spatial distribution of economic activity in West Germany. Since
West Germany remained a market-based economy after the East-West division, we
would expect the mechanisms emphasized in the model to apply there.
The key prediction of the model is that West German cities close to the new border
will decline relative to other West German cities. The reason is that these cities are
disproportionately aﬀected by the loss of access to markets and sources of supply on the
other side of the border in the former eastern parts of Germany. Furthermore, among
West German cities close to the border, the decline in relative size is predicted to be
constructed.
7The so called Basic Treaty (“Grundlagenvertrag”) of December 1972 between East and West
Germany recognized “two German states in one German nation.” Following this treaty East and West
Germany were accepted as full members of the United Nations.
8For related theories of city development, see Henderson (1974) and Black and Henderson (1999).
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greater for smaller settlements, where the city’s own market is smaller in scale, and
where access to economic activity in other cities is correspondingly more important.
3.1. Endowments and Consumer Behavior
We begin by considering a single integrated market economy consisting of a fixed
number of cities c ∈ {1, . . . , C}, each of which is endowed with an exogenous stock
of non-traded amenities, Hc, in perfectly inelastic supply. Following Helpman (1998),
we interpret these non-traded amenities as housing, but they capture any immobile
resource which generates congestion costs and therefore acts as a force for the dispersion
of economic activity.9
The economy as a whole is populated by a mass of representative consumers, Lc,
who are mobile across cities and are endowed with a single unit of labour which is
supplied inelastically with zero disutility. Utility is defined over a consumption index
of traded manufacturing goods, CMc , and consumption of non-traded housing, C
H
c .
The upper level utility function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas:10
Uc =
¡
CMc
¢µ ¡
CHc
¢1−µ
, 0 < µ < 1. (1)
The manufacturing consumption index takes the standard CES (Dixit-Stiglitz)
form and we assume that manufacturing varieties are subject to iceberg trade costs.
In order for one unit of a variety produced in city i to arrive in city c, a quantity
Tic > 1 must be shipped, so that Tic − 1 measures proportional trade costs. The dual
manufacturing price index is as follows:
PMc =
"X
i
ni(piTic)1−σ
#1/(1−σ)
, (2)
where we have used the fact that all ni manufacturing varieties produced in city i face
the same elasticity of demand and charge the same equilibrium price pic = Ticpi to
consumers in city c.
9 In the model, a city’s endowment of the immobile resource captures its “natural advantage.” Other
sources of natural advantage, such as technology diﬀerences, may be introduced but their eﬀects are
similar to those of the immobile resource endowment.
10To clarify the exposition below, we use c to indicate a city when it is consuming and i to indicate
a city when it is producing.
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The price index in equation (2) depends on access to sources of supply of manu-
facturing goods, as captured by the number of varieties and their free on board prices
in each city i, together with the trade costs of shipping the varieties from cities i to c.
We summarize access to sources of supply using the concept of supplier access, SAc,
defined as in Redding and Venables (2004), but here relating to consumer rather than
intermediate goods:
PMc = [SAc]
1/(1−σ) , SAc ≡
X
i
ni(piTic)
1−σ. (3)
Applying Shephard’s lemma to the manufacturing price index, we obtain equilib-
rium city c demand for a manufacturing variety produced in i:
xic = p
−σ
i (Tic)
1−σ (µEc)
¡
PMc
¢σ−1
, (4)
where Ec denotes total expenditure which equals total income and, with Cobb-Douglas
utility, consumers spend a constant share of their income, µ, on manufacturing goods.
With constant expenditure shares and housing in inelastic supply, the equilibrium
price of housing depends solely on the expenditure share, (1 − µ), total expenditure,
Ec, and the supply of housing, Hc:
PHc =
(1− µ)Ec
Hc
. (5)
Total expenditure is the sum of labor income and expenditure on housing which is
assumed to be redistributed to the city population:
Ec = wcLc + (1− µ)Ec =
wcLc
µ
. (6)
3.2. Production Technology
There is a fixed cost in terms of labour of producing manufacturing varieties, F > 0,
and a constant variable cost. The total amount of labor, l, required to produce x units
of a variety is:
l = F + x, (7)
where we have normalized the variable labour requirement to one.
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Profit maximization subject to a downward sloping demand curve for each manu-
facturing variety yields the standard result that the equilibrium free on board price of
manufacturing varieties is a constant mark-up over marginal cost:
pi =
µ
σ
σ − 1
¶
wi. (8)
Combining profit maximization with free entry in manufacturing, equilibrium out-
put of each manufacturing variety equals the following constant:
x = xi =
X
c
xic = F (σ − 1). (9)
Given demand in all markets, the free on board price charged by a manufacturing
firm in each city must be low enough in order to sell a quantity x and cover the firm’s
fixed production costs. We saw above that free on board prices are a constant mark-up
over marginal cost. Therefore, given demand in all markets, the equilibrium wage in
city i, wi, must be suﬃciently low in order for a manufacturing firm to sell x and cover
its fixed production costs. Together, equations (4), (8) and (9) define the following
manufacturing wage equation:µ
σwi
σ − 1
¶σ
=
1
x
X
c
(wcLc)
¡
PMc
¢σ−1
(Tic)
1−σ . (10)
This relationship pins down the maximum wage that a manufacturing firm in city i
can aﬀord to pay given demand in all markets and the production technology.
On the right-hand side of the equation, market c demand for varieties produced in
i depends on total expenditure on manufacturing varieties, µEc = wcLc, the manufac-
turing price index, PMc , that summarizes the price of competing varieties, and on trade
costs, Tic. Total demand for varieties produced in i is the weighted sum of demand in
all markets, where the weights are bilateral trade costs, Tic.
Defining the weighted sum of market demands as market access, MAi, the manu-
facturing wage equation may be written more compactly as:
wi = ξ [MAi]
1/σ , MAi ≡
X
c
(wcLc)
¡
PMc
¢σ−1
(Tic)
1−σ , (11)
where ξ collects together earlier constants. It is clear from the manufacturing wage
equation that cities close to large markets (lower trade costs Tic to high values of
(wcLc)
¡
PMc
¢σ−1) will pay higher equilibrium nominal wages.
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Note that the concept of market access (equation (11)) relates to a firm’s proximity
to the markets in which it sells its output, while the concept of supplier access (equation
(3)) relates to a consumer’s proximity to sources of supply of goods purchased. Clearly
both terms relate to access to markets, whether for firms or for consumers. In what
follows, when we refer to market access we are usually concerned with both aspects of
proximity to markets and, except when the distinction between them is important, we
use the term market access to refer to them both.
3.3. Factor Market Equilibrium
With integrated factor markets, individuals will move across cities to arbitrage away
real wage diﬀerences. The real wage depends on the price of traded manufacturing
varieties and non-traded housing, and we thus obtain the following labor mobility
condition:
1 =
wc
(PMc )
µ (PHc )
1−µ , for all c (12)
where we have chosen the real wage in one city as the numeraire and implicitly assume
that all cities are populated in equilibrium.
The no arbitrage condition (12) is clearly a long-run relationship. Adjustment
costs imply that it will take some time for city populations to adjust towards their
new steady-state values after an exogenous shock to real wages. The simplest way to
model such an adjustment process is to assume, as in Krugman (1991) and Fujita et
al. (1999), that migration is proportional to the real wage gap between cities.11
Labor market clearing implies that labor demand in manufacturing sums to the
city population. Using the constant equilibrium output of each variety in equation
(9) and the manufacturing production technology in equation (7), the labor market
clearing condition may be written as follows:
Li = nili = niFσ, (13)
where li denotes the constant equilibrium labor demand for each variety. This rela-
tionship pins down the number of manufacturing varieties produced in each city as a
function of city population and parameters of the model.
11Baldwin (2001) replaces this myopic migration decision with forward-looking rational expectations
and finds that the qualitative implications of the economic geography model remain unchanged.
The Costs of Remoteness 13
3.4. Properties of General Equilibrium
General equilibrium is fully characterized by a vector of seven variables {wc, pc,
Lc, nc, PMc , P
H
c , Ec}. The equilibrium vector is determined by the system of seven
equations defined by (11), (8), (12), (13), (3), (5) and (6). All other endogenous
variables may be written as functions of this vector. As usual in the new economic
geography literature, the inherent non-linearity of the model makes it impossible to
find closed form solutions for the equilibrium values. We will therefore calibrate the
model to observed city populations in pre-war Germany and simulate the implications
of the imposition of the East-West border.
Before calibrating and simulating the model, we analyze some of the basic prop-
erties of the model analytically in order to gain further intuition for the economic
mechanisms at work. Using the manufacturing wage equation (11) together with the
expressions for the manufacturing price index (2) and the price of housing (5), the
labor mobility condition may be rewritten to yield an equilibrium relationship linking
endogenous city size to endogenous market access, endogenous supplier access and the
exogenous endowment of housing (the immobile resource):
Lc = χ(MAc)
µ
σ(1−µ) (SAc)
µ
(1−µ)(σ−1) Hc (14)
where χ collects together earlier constants.
We begin by analyzing the properties of this relationship around a given equilib-
rium. Cities with higher equilibrium values of market access, higher equilibrium values
of supplier access (as σ > 1) and greater housing stocks will have larger equilibrium
populations. The intuition for this is straightforward. High market access raises the
maximum nominal wage that a manufacturing firm can aﬀord to pay in a city. This
increases the real wage, making the city a more attractive place to live. Similarly, high
supplier access reduces the cost of consuming manufacturing varieties, which raises the
real wage in a city. Finally, a larger supply of housing reduces the price of housing and
therefore also increases the real wage, enhancing the attraction of a city.
Now consider the impact of an exogenous increase in trade costs Tic between pairs
of cities. In particular, suppose that the previously integrated economy is divided
in two by a border and the costs of crossing this border are prohibitive. This has a
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stark eﬀect on cities close to the border. They will experience a sharp fall in both
their market and supplier access as the border separates them from nearby trading
partners, with which they could previously interact at low transport costs. The eﬀect
on cities further away from the border is more muted. These cities already had higher
trade costs to counterparts on the other side of the border to begin with, and therefore
experience a smaller drop in their access to markets and sources of supply when the
border is drawn.
As a result, real wages in the cities close to the border will decline relative to other
cities. This will trigger a population outflow from cities close to the border, further
reducing their market and supplier access, and increasing market and supplier access
in other cities. Falling population in border cities will lead to a decline in the price of
housing, while the induced increase in population in other cities will lead to a rise in
the price of their housing stock, until the factor mobility condition (14) again holds.12
3.5. Calibration and Simulation
We calibrate the model to the distribution of population across cities in pre-war
Germany and simulate the eﬀect of a closed East-West border on the equilibrium dis-
tribution of population within West Germany. The data are described in further detail
in the next section. The model’s parameters include the share of housing in consumer
expenditure (µ), the elasticity of substitution between manufacturing varieties (σ), the
fixed production cost (F ), and bilateral trade costs (Tic). The choice of parameter val-
ues is discussed in the Appendix and is consistent with standard values in the existing
literature.
We focus on parameter values where σ (1− µ) > 1 and hence there is a unique
stable equilibrium in the Helpman model.13 If instead parameter values are such that
σ (1− µ) < 1, there are multiple equilibria. In either case, market access is central in
determining the distribution of population across cities. With multiple equilibria, the
changes in market access induced by German division could shift the economy between
12 If the supply of housing was itself allowed to adjust, depreciating in cities whose population has
fallen and expanding in cities whose population has risen, this would magnify the relative decline of
cities proximate to the closed border.
13This is analogous to the “no black holes” condition in Krugman (1991).
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alternative equilibrium population distributions. We return to consider this possibility
below when we analyze the eﬀects of reunification.
Following the large gravity equation literature in international trade, we model
bilateral transport costs as a function of distance when cities are not separated by a
closed border. Consistent with the empirical estimates in Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) and Redding and Venables (2004), the exponent on distance is set equal to
minus one. We capture the eﬀects of division by assuming that transport costs across
the East-West German border become infinite, while transport costs between West
German cities remain an exponential function of distance.
We calibrate the housing stock of each city (Hc) to pre-war data. We take the
observed distribution of population across German cities in 1939 and solve for the
implied values of city housing stocks needed in order for real wages to be equalized
across cities in equilibrium.14 Having calibrated the housing stock in this way, we
simulate the eﬀect of the change in bilateral trade costs caused by division. We allow
the population of West Germany to reallocate itself across cities in response to this
exogenous shock until a new long-run spatial equilibrium is reached.15 In the transition
between steady-states, cities will exhibit diﬀerent rates of population growth as the
economy gradually adjusts towards the new long-run equilibrium.
The simulation involves solving the full general equilibrium of the model and yields
predictions for the change in the population of each West German city. Two striking
regularities emerge from the analysis. The first is a sharp decline in the relative size of
West German cities close to the border. Figure 1 compares actual 1939 city populations
with the new steady-state values implied by the simulation, and reports mean changes
in city population within grid cells at varying distances from the new East-West border.
The simulation predicts a substantial negative impact of the East-West border on cities
within 100 kilometers of the border, with the impact being much more pronounced for
cities close to the border. For distances between 100 and 200 kilometers the simulation
suggests only minor changes in population, while the mean change in city population
14 In the model, the housing stock captures any immobile resource which acts as a source of conges-
tion, and therefore we cannot directly observe this variable.
15The qualitative results of the simulation do not depend on holding the total West German popu-
lation constant at its 1939 level.
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at more than 200 kilometers is predicted to be positive, as required by labour market
clearing.
The size of the mean decline in city populations does not necessarily fall monoton-
ically with distance from the East-West border for several reasons. Distance to the
border is only an imperfect proxy for the amount of economic hinterland that a city
has lost due to the border. Furthermore, as discussed immediately below, the impact
of the border depends substantially on the initial size of the city.
The second striking regularity that emerges from the simulation is that division is
predicted to have a larger impact on the population of small cities than large cities.
In small cities, the own market is less important relative to markets in other cities.
Therefore, the loss of access to markets in other cities has a larger proportionate impact
on overall market access. Figure 2 illustrates this point by displaying the mean change
in population within 75 kilometers of the East-West border for cities of diﬀerent sizes.
For cities with a 1939 population below the West German median of 59,000, the decline
in population is predicted to be four times larger than for cities with 1939 populations
above the West German median.
The results of the simulation vary intuitively with parameter values. Increasing
the sensitivity of transport costs to distance steepens the rate at which the simulated
impact diminishes with distance from the border. Increasing the share of expenditure
on immobile housing reduces the magnitude of the eﬀects, as adjustment in the price of
immobile housing becomes more important in preserving the attractiveness of border
locations. The two main predictions of the model - a large negative eﬀect close to the
border that diminishes rapidly with distance from the border and a disproportionately
large impact on the populations of small cities - are robust across parameter values.
They are basic implications of increasing returns to scale, transport costs and love of
variety preferences which mean that the proximity and size of surrounding markets
become important in determining a location’s attractiveness.
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4. Empirical Strategy and Data
4.1. Data Description
Our basic dataset is a panel of West German cities covering the period from 1919
until 2002, which includes the city populations for all West German cities which had
more than 20,000 inhabitants in 1919.16 For the pre-war period city populations are
only available for the census years, which were 1919, 1925, 1933 and 1939. For the
post-war period we have collected data at 10 year intervals between 1950 and 1980
and also for the years 1988 immediately prior to reunification, 1992 immediately after
reunification, and 2002. A detailed description of the sources of all our data is contained
in the data appendix.
Our data refer to administrative cities as data on metropolitan areas is unavailable
over such a long time period for Germany. To ensure the data on administrative cities
are as comparable as possible over time, we aggregate cities which merge between 1919
and 2002 for all years in our sample. In addition we are able to track all settlements
with a population greater than 10,000 in 1919 which merge with a city in our sample,
in which case we aggregate the settlement with the city for all years in the sample.
The Appendix reports details of these aggregations. This results in smooth population
series for most cities. Finally, there are other smaller changes in city boundaries that
aﬀect small cities in particular. We record all city-year observations in which a city
reports a merger and the population series for the city is visibly aﬀected, and exploit
this information in the econometric analysis below.
After aggregating cities that merge we are left with a sample of 119 West German
cities, not including West Berlin, which we exclude from all our estimates to avoid
that any of our results are driven by the isolated location of West Berlin as an island
within East Germany.17 Table 1 lists the subset of 20 cities out of these 119 cities that
were located within 75 kilometers of the East-West border. Distance to the border is
16This choice of sample ensures that the composition of cities is not itself aﬀected by the division of
Germany after World War II.
17We have also excluded the cities Saarbrücken, Saarlouis and Völklingen, which are located in the
Saarland. The Saarland was under French administration after World War I until 1935 and also after
World War II until 1957, which substantially reduces the amount of data available for these cities and
also makes it questionable whether they are a valid control group. Including the available information
for these cities in the sample does not change any of our results.
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measured as the shortest Great Circle Distance from a city to any point on the border
between East and West Germany.
The data on population are combined with information on a variety of other city
characteristics. First, we have collected data on total employment and employment
in industry in each city. For 1939 we also obtained a detailed breakdown of total
employment into 28 sectors. Second, we have collected information on the share of
population over 65 in each city. Finally, we have obtained two measures of the degree
of war-related destruction by city. These are the amount of rubble in cubic metres
per capita and the number of destroyed dwellings as a percentage of the 1939 stock of
dwellings.
Even though our main focus in this paper is West German cities, we have also
collected the populations of all other cities that were part of Germany prior to World
War II and had more than 20,000 inhabitants in 1919. We will use this data in section
6 to construct market potentials for the West German cities. For this purpose we have
also collected the latitude and longitude of each city in our sample and computed the
great circle distance between cities. The distribution of all cities in our sample within
pre-war Germany is shown in Map 1.
4.2. Empirical Strategy
The main prediction of our theoretical model is that the imposition of the East-
West border will result in a reduction in population growth rates in cities close to
the border relative to cities further from the border, as the economy adjusts to a new
steady state equilibrium. Similarly, the removal of this border due to the reunification
of East and West Germany in 1990 should increase the relative population growth rate
of cities close to the East-West border.
To investigate this hypothesis we adopt a simple ‘diﬀerence in diﬀerences’ method-
ology. We compare the growth performance of West German cities which were located
close to the border between East and West Germany (our treatment group) with the
growth performance of other West German cities (our control group). We examine
the eﬀects of division by undertaking this comparison before and after the division of
Germany in the wake of World War II. Similarly, we examine the eﬀects of the re-
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unification of East and West Germany by undertaking the comparison for the periods
of division and reunification. For our basic results we are going to classify cities as
close to the border if they were within 75 kilometers of the East-West border. We
will show below that this choice of cutoﬀ is empirically plausible and is corroborated
in non-parametric estimates which do not impose a particular distance metric on the
data.
Much of our analysis focuses on the impact of division, which involved a much
larger change in market access than reunification, and where we have a longer time
period over which to analyse the eﬀects. We will return to the impact of reunification
in Section 7 and present empirical results that suggest a symmetric pattern to that
observed in response to the division of Germany.
Our baseline econometric equation is a long-diﬀerences specification where we pool
annualized rates of growth of West German city populations over the periods 1919-25,
1925-33, 1933-39, 1950-60, 1960-70, 1970-80 and 1980-88. We exclude the 1939-50
diﬀerence to abstract from the Second World War period.18 We regress annualized
city population growth (Popgrowthct) on a dummy (Borderc) which is equal to one
when a city is a member of the treatment group within 75 kilometers of the border,
on an interaction term between Borderc and a dummy (Divisiont) which is equal to
one when Germany is divided, and on a full set of time dummies (dt):
Popgrowthct = βBorderc + γ (Borderc ×Divisiont) + dt + εct (15)
where εct is a stochastic error.
This specification allows for unobserved fixed eﬀects in city population levels, which
are diﬀerenced out when we take long diﬀerences. The time dummies control for
common macroeconomic shocks which aﬀect the population growth of all West German
cities and secular trends in rates of population growth over time. They will also capture
any eﬀect of division on the average population growth of all West German cities.
The coeﬃcient β on the border dummy captures any systematic diﬀerence in rates
of population growth between treatment and control groups prior to division. The co-
18Later we introduce explicit controls for destruction caused by the Second World War. The results
are robust to including the 1939-50 diﬀerence during which border and non-border cities experience
relatively similar rates of population growth.
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eﬃcient γ on the interaction term between the border dummy and the division dummy
captures any systematic change in the relative growth performance of treatment and
control groups of cities following German division. A negative and statistically signif-
icant value of γ implies a decline in the rate of growth of border cities compared to
non-border cities following German division, as predicted by the theoretical model.
The identification of the impact of division on border cities comes from an interac-
tion between a characteristic of cities (whether they lie within 75 kilometers of what
became the East-West border) and time (whether Germany is divided in any partic-
ular year). This corresponds to a ‘diﬀerence in diﬀerences’ specification, where we
diﬀerence between groups of cities (treatment and control) and between time periods
(periods when Germany is integrated and periods when Germany is divided).
To address concerns about serial correlation using diﬀerence in diﬀerences estima-
tors (Duflo et al. 2004), we cluster the standard errors on city. We also consider
augmented versions of this baseline specification where we allow for more general error
components, including state (“Länder”) dummies or city fixed eﬀects in population
growth rates. When city fixed eﬀects in population growth rates are included, the
border dummy (Bordc) is dropped since it is colinear with the fixed eﬀects.
5. Baseline Empirical Results
5.1. Basic Diﬀerence in Diﬀerences Analysis
Before we estimate our basic specification (15), Figures 3 and 4 summarize the
impact of the East-West border on the West German border cities. Figure 3 graphs
total city population over time for the treatment group of border cities and the control
group of non-border cities. For each group, total population is expressed as an index
relative to its 1919 value, so that the index takes the value one in 1919. The two vertical
lines indicate the year 1949 when the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)
and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) were established and the year
1990 when East and West Germany were reunified. Figure 4 graphs the diﬀerence
between the two population indices and corresponds to a simple graphical diﬀerence
in diﬀerences estimate of the impact of division on the population of border relative
to non-border cities.
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In the period prior to World War II, population growth of border and non-border
cities is very similar, with border cities suﬀering slightly more from the Great Depres-
sion of the early 1930s but recovering their trend rate of growth by 1939. During the
Second World War and its immediate aftermath, border cities experience marginally
higher population growth than non-border cities, probably due to migration from East
Germany and the areas of pre-war Germany which became part of Poland and Russia.
This pattern changes sharply after 1949, when East and West Germany emerge
as separate states with diﬀerent economic systems and local economic links are sev-
ered. From this point onwards, West German cities close to the new East-West border
experience substantially lower rates of population growth than non-border cities. Pop-
ulation in the border cities actually falls between 1960 and 1980, whereas population
in non-border cities continues to grow.19
By the early 1980s, the discrepancy in rates of population growth begins to close,
consistent with the idea that the negative treatment eﬀect of division on border cities
has gradually worked itself out and the distribution of population in West Germany
is approaching a new steady state. However, the slower decline of the border cities
during the 1970s and 1980s could at least in part be due to the extensive regional
policy programmes aimed at supporting the areas close to the border with East Ger-
many, which grew substantially during this period. To the extent that these subsidy
programmes were successful in promoting the development of the border regions, our
estimates provide a lower bound to the negative treatment eﬀect of division on border
cities. We examine the eﬀectiveness of these regional policies in Section 6 below.
Following reunification in 1990, there is a step-increase in city population in West
Germany, reflecting migration from the former East Germany. This migration raised
population in non-border cities by somewhat more than in border cities. From 1992
onwards, population in the border cities grows somewhat faster compared to non-
border cities, which is consistent with the beginning of a recovery in the border cities
due to improved market access after reunification.
19From Figure 4, the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 has no substantive eﬀect on the relative
performance of West German border and non-border cities, as one would expect from West Berlin’s
isolated location far from West Germany.
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5.2. Parametric Estimates
Table 2 contains our baseline parametric results. In Column (1) we estimate equa-
tion (15) and regress annualized rates of population growth between 1919 and 1988 on
the border dummy, the border×division interaction, and a full set of time dummies.
The coeﬃcient β on the border dummy is positive but not statistically significant, con-
sistent with no systematic diﬀerence in population growth rates between the treatment
and control groups prior to division.
The coeﬃcient γ on the border×division interaction is negative and highly statis-
tically significant, consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model. Division
leads to a reduction in the annualized rate of growth of border cities relative to non-
border cities of about 0.75 percentage points. This estimate implies a decline in the
population of border cities relative to non-border cities over a period of 38 years of
around one third,20 in line with the diﬀerence in the population indices for border and
non-border cities between 1950 and 1988 in Figure 4.
In Column (2) we examine heterogeneity over time in the treatment eﬀect of division
on border cities. Instead of considering a single interaction term between the border
dummy and a dummy for the period of division, we introduce separate interaction
terms between the border dummy and individual years when Germany was divided.
These border×division year interactions are jointly highly statistically significant and
their magnitude declines monotonically over time. After some thirty years, the size
of the treatment eﬀect falls by approximately 2/3 from 1.25 percentage points during
1950-60 to 0.40 percentage points during 1980-88, consistent with relative city size
gradually adjusting towards a new long-run equilibrium.
In Column (3) we investigate heterogeneity in the treatment eﬀect depending on
distance from the East-West border. Instead of considering a single border measure
based on a distance threshold of 75 kilometers, we introduce a series of dummies for
cities lying within cells 25 kilometers wide at varying distances from the border ranging
from 0-25 kilometers to 75-100 kilometers. We include both the distance cell dummies
and their interactions with division, where the interaction terms capture the treatment
20Since (1.0075)38 = 1.33.
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eﬀect of division on cities within a distance cell. The estimated coeﬃcients on the
division interactions for 0-25 kilometers, 25-50 kilometers and 50-75 kilometers are
negative and statistically significant, while the estimated coeﬃcient on the interaction
for 75-100 kilometers is positive but not statistically significant.
This pattern of estimates is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model.
The negative treatment eﬀect of division on border cities is highly localized, with
little evidence of any eﬀect beyond 75 kilometers from the border. One somewhat
surprising feature of the estimates is that the coeﬃcient for the 0-25 kilometers grid cell
is actually smaller than that for the 25-50 kilometers grid cell, though the diﬀerence
is not statistically significant. From the simulation of the model, one would have
expected a larger negative treatment eﬀect for cities in the immediate vicinity of the
border. We present evidence below that this pattern of results could be related to the
operation of federal subsidy programmes for the border regions.
Column (4) returns to our baseline specification from Column (1) and includes a set
of state dummies. These control for variation in city population growth across states
associated with diﬀerences in policies, institutions and other potentially unobserved
characteristics of states. Again we find a very similar pattern of results, with division
leading to a decline in annualized population growth rates of border cities of about
0.75 percentage points.
Finally, in Column (5) we include city fixed eﬀects in population growth rates. Note
that our long diﬀerences specification already controls for city fixed eﬀects in popu-
lation levels. The specification with population growth fixed eﬀects is conceptually
somewhat unattractive, since it implies an ever-growing variance of city populations.
The counterbalancing advantage is that it controls for unobserved heterogeneity across
cities in the determinants of population growth. Once again we find a very similar neg-
ative and highly statistically significant treatment eﬀect from division on the growth of
border cities. Though not reported in the interests of brevity, all the results presented
below are very similar when population growth fixed eﬀects are included. This is con-
sistent with the drawing of the new border between East and West Germany having
been driven by factors which are uncorrelated with fixed city characteristics.
We also considered a number of further robustness tests not reported here. We re-
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estimated the model excluding individual states, excluding treatment cities which are
close to the coast (as this may mitigate their loss of market access), excluding city-year
observations where a city reports a merger that is not captured by our aggregations
and the merger visibly aﬀects the city’s population series, and using an alternative
estimation sample based on all West German cities with a population of greater than
50,000 in 2002. In each case, we find that division leads to a quantitatively similar and
highly statistically significant decline in the population growth of border cities relative
to other West German cities.
5.3. Non-parametric Estimates
In this section, we present the results of an alternative estimation strategy that
enables us to estimate a separate Division treatment for each city. We regress annual-
ized population growth in West German cities on a full set of city fixed eﬀects (ηi) and
interactions between the city fixed eﬀects and the division dummy (ηi ×Divisiont):
Popgrowthct =
NX
i=1
µiηi +
NX
i=1
θi (ηi ×Divisiont) + ωct (16)
where c and i index cities; N is the number of cities in our sample; ηi is a dummy
which is equal to zero except for city i when it takes the value one; Divisiont is defined
as above; µi and θi are coeﬃcients to be estimated; and ωct is a stochastic error.
The coeﬃcients µi on the city fixed eﬀects capture mean population growth for
individual cities during the pre-war period. The coeﬃcients θi on the interaction terms
between the city fixed eﬀects and division capture the change in individual cities’ mean
rates of population growth between the pre-war and division periods, and correspond
to a separate treatment eﬀect of division for each West German city.
The interaction terms between the city fixed eﬀects and division are jointly highly
statistically significant (p-value=0.000) and Figure 5 graphs the estimated values of
the division treatments against distance from the East-West German border. For ease
of interpretation, we have normalized the division treatments in the figure so that their
mean value across cities is equal to zero. We exclude from the figure cities that are
more than 250 kilometers away from the East-West border, since there are only seven
of these in the far Western extremities of West Germany.
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The non-parametric specification estimates separate treatment eﬀects for each in-
dividual West German city and imposes no prior structure on how these are related
to distance from the East-West border. Nonetheless, we find a strong relationship
between the estimated treatment eﬀects and distance from the East-West border. The
estimated coeﬃcients for cities close to the border are clustered below zero, implying
that these cities experience a below average change in their population growth rates
between the pre-war and division periods. Furthermore, the negative impact of division
is highly localized as predicted by the theoretical simulation, with the decline in rela-
tive growth performance most evident for cities within 75 kilometers of the East-West
border, confirming the findings of the parametric estimation above.
Table 3 examines the statistical significance of diﬀerences in the non-parametric
estimates. We test whether the estimated Division treatment within 75 kilometers
of the East-West border diﬀers from the Division treatment across all cities (Column
1), the Division treatment between 75 kilometers and 150 kilometers from the border
(Column 2), the Division treatment between 150 kilometers and 225 kilometers from
the border (Column 3), and the Division treatment more than 225 kilometers from the
border. In all cases, we easily reject the null that the two treatments are the same at
conventional levels of statistical significance.
6. The Role of Market Access
The empirical results so far have presented clear evidence that population growth
in West German cities close to the East-West border declined relative to population
growth in other West German cities during the period when Germany was divided.
This finding is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model, which empha-
sizes the negative impact from the loss of access to markets on the other side of the
border.
It would be diﬃcult to explain the observed pattern of estimates with the other
two leading explanations for diﬀerences in economic performance, namely diﬀerences
in institutions or natural endowments. As both border and non-border cities are part
of the same country during all years of our sample, there are no obvious diﬀerences in
institutions between our treatment and control cities that could be responsible for the
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decline of the border cities. Similarly, there is no simple explanation for our findings
in terms of changes in natural advantage, such as access to navigable rivers or coasts,
climatic conditions or the disease environment.21
Nonetheless, there are other possible explanations for our findings. Three sets of
explanations are particularly salient. The first set of explanations relates to city struc-
ture. Perhaps industrial structure diﬀers systematically between the treatment and
control groups, and the industries in which border cities are specialized are precisely
those industries which declined during the period of division relative to the period
prior to the Second World War.
The second set of explanations is concerned with devastation associated with the
Second World War. Cities in the treatment and control groups could diﬀer system-
atically in terms of the extent of destruction that they experienced during the war.
This could in turn explain the change in their relative growth performance between
the pre-war and division periods. Finally, the decline of the border cities could be due
to the threat of further armed conflict. People may have moved out of cities within
75 kilometers of the East German border, because they felt that these cities would be
particularly vulnerable in the event of a subsequent war in Western Europe.22
In the remainder of this section, we present several pieces of additional evidence
that the decline of the border cities is driven by their loss of market access, rather than
by these alternative explanations.
6.1. Adding Market Potential
We begin by providing evidence that the negative treatment eﬀect of division can
be completely explained away by a measure of market access taken from the empirical
economic geography literature. Following a long tradition dating back to Harris (1954),
we calculate a measure of West German cities’ market potential equal to the distance-
21Our empirical findings also cannot be easily explained by models of stochastic city growth (see for
example Simon 1955 and Gabaix 1999). If city development follows an independent stochastic process,
the imposition of the East-West border has no clear eﬀect on the relative growth prospects of West
German cities close to and far from the border.
22Another alternative explanation is that the relative decline of the East-West German border cities
is driven by closer economic integration between West Germany and its EU trade partners further west.
While superficially plausible this explanation is hard to reconcile with the timing of the treatment
(stronger in the 1950s and 1960s than later) and with the highly localized nature of the eﬀect (within
75 kilometers of the East-West border).
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weighted sum of population in all German cities from which they are not separated by
a border:
MPOTct =
X
i
µ
Icit
distci
¶
Lit (17)
where the dummy variable Icit captures division; Icit takes the value one for a pair of
cities c and i from pre-war Germany that are not separated by a border and it takes
the value zero otherwise; thus when one city is West German and the other is East
German, Icit will equal one during 1919-39 and zero during 1950-88; distci is the Great
Circle Distance between cities c and i; Lit denotes population in city i at time t.
Market potential provides a measure of a city’s proximity to population centres,
which takes into account the full matrix of bilateral distances and the full vector of
city sizes. The theoretical measure of market access in equation (11) depends on trade
costs, population, nominal wages and price indices in each city. The empirical measure
of market potential in equation (17) captures trade costs with distance and whether
cities are separated by a closed border, and exploits information on population, but
does not control for variation in nominal wages and price indices on which information
is not available at the city-level. Empirical evidence from other contexts where a
theory-based measure of market access can be constructed (see for example Redding
and Venables 2004 and Head and Mayer 2004) suggests that market potential is highly
correlated with theory-based measures of market access.
The model suggests that changes in market access lead to changes in city popula-
tion (equation (14)). Therefore, for each city, we construct an index equal to market
potential divided by its 1919 value. The evolution of this index over time captures
changes in city market potential due to German division. After 1949, with the division
of pre-war Germany, all cities in West Germany lose access to population centres in
East Germany and in the areas which became part of Poland and Russia. The fall in
market potential will be greater for West German cities close to the new East-West
border since these have smaller distances to population centres further East.
Table 4 presents estimation results incorporating this empirical measure of market
potential. In Column (1) we reproduce our baseline estimates from Column (1) of Ta-
ble 2. In Column (2) we estimate the same specification augmented with the market
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potential index. The estimated coeﬃcient on market potential is positive and highly
statistically significant, consistent with the idea that an increase in market potential
spurs population growth. More interesting is the impact on the border×division inter-
action. The coeﬃcient on this interaction term falls by an order of magnitude so that
it is now close to zero and statistically insignificant.
While this result is suggestive that the decline in the border cities can be explained
by changes in market access, one potential problem with the specification is that this
measure of market potential is likely to be endogenous. Changes in a West German
city’s market potential are not only driven by the exogenous loss of eastern markets as
a result of German division, but also by changes in the population of other surrounding
West German cities and changes in own city population. These changes could be driven
by unobserved shocks which not only impact on market potential but also have direct
eﬀects on population growth.
To address this problem we construct a direct measure of the loss of eastern markets
due to division for each West German city. We use the 1939 distribution of population
across cities to calculate the market potential derived by each West German city from
markets in East Germany and the regions of Germany that became part of Poland and
Russia after the Second World War. Our measure of lost eastern markets is equal to
zero before 1949 and then equal to a city’s eastern market potential as measured in
1939 for all years when Germany is divided.
Column (3) includes this measure in our baseline specification from Column (1).
The estimated coeﬃcient on the border×division interaction falls by around one half
and is no longer statistically significant. The measure of eastern market potential is
negatively signed, suggesting that cities with a larger loss of eastern market potential
experienced a decline in population growth relative to other West German cities fol-
lowing division, although the coeﬃcient is not statistically significant at conventional
values (p-value=0.13).
An implicit assumption in Column (3) is that the loss of 1939 eastern market
potential provides an equally good explanation for West German city growth in the
1980s some 30 years after division as in the immediate aftermath of division. From
our earlier results one would expect the loss of eastern market potential to be a more
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powerful determinant of city population growth in the early years after division. To
investigate this possibility Column (4) restricts our post-war sample to the period 1950
to 1970. We now find that the coeﬃcient on the border×division interaction is close
to zero and statistically insignificant, while our measure of eastern market potential is
negatively signed and highly statistically significant. In Column (5) we further restrict
the sample to cities within 150 kilometers of the East-West German border. Again we
can completely explain the slowdown in the population growth of border cities relative
to other West German cities with our measure of eastern market potential loss. All
of these results suggest that the loss of access to markets due to German division can
entirely account for the decline of the border cities.
6.2. Size Heterogeneity
The theoretical model has an additional implication which we have not exploited
so far. Our simulations indicated that the imposition of the new East-West border
should have a disproportionately large eﬀect on smaller border cities. The intuition
for this pattern is that in small cities, the own market is less important relative to
markets in other cities. As a result, the loss of access to population centres on the
other side of the East-West border has a larger impact on overall market access for
smaller cities than for larger cities.
Columns (6) and (7) of Table 4 test this additional prediction of the model. In
Column (6) we re-estimate the specification from Column (1) for the sub-sample of
cities with a population in 1919 below the median value for that year. Column (7)
repeats the exercise for cities with a 1919 population greater than or equal to the
median.23 The estimated treatment eﬀect is negative for both sub-samples of cities.
However, in line with the predictions of the theoretical model, the negative treatment
eﬀect is substantially larger and more precisely estimated for the sub-sample of smaller
cities. Smaller cities do indeed suﬀer disproportionately from the loss of access to
markets across the new East-West border.
This particular impact of the border is not only consistent with our economic
23We split the sample based on the 1919 population distribution to ensure that the split is not driven
by population growth during the sample period.
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geography model but it is also diﬃcult to account for with the other explanations for
the decline of the border cities which we discussed above. In particular it is diﬃcult to
reconcile this pattern with the view that the decline of the border cities was driven by
fear of further armed conflict. Larger population centres have historically been more
attractive military targets, and one would therefore expect the fear of further armed
conflict to lead to at least as large a decline in population growth for larger border
cities as for smaller border cities.24
6.3. Employment and Demography
The mechanisms underlying the negative treatment eﬀect in the model work through
both access to markets and access to sources of supply. Reduced market access lowers
the maximum nominal wage that a manufacturing firm can aﬀord to pay in a location.
Reduced supplier access raises the price index for tradeable manufacturing goods.
This suggests that the economically inactive, in particular the retired, should be less
aﬀected by the border as they receive an income which is independent of their location
and only suﬀer from the increased price index due to reduced supplier access. Table
5 investigates this hypothesis using a variety of alternative measures of whether the
burden of division falls disproportionately on the economically active. These comprise
the share of the population over 65, the ratio of employment to population and the
ratio of employment in industry to population.
The data on demographic structure and employment are unavailable for some years
resulting in a smaller sample. Column (1) estimates our baseline specification from
Column (1) of Table 2 for the subset of years over which demographic data are available
and shows that a very similar pattern of results is found despite the smaller sample. In
Column (2) we regress the percentage of the city population over 65 years old on the
same set of explanatory variables. The estimated coeﬃcient on the border×division
interaction is positive and statistically significant, implying that division was followed
by an increase in the share of the population above working age in border cities relative
24There are also general considerations casting doubt on the alternative hypothesis of fear of further
armed conflict. Given the heavy reliance on nuclear deterence, further armed conflict would probably
have resulted in the widespread destruction of large parts of Western Europe. Furthermore, it is
unlikely that even a smaller scale conventional conflict in Germany would have been confined to a
narrow strip along the East-West German border.
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to other West German cities. This is consistent with a decline in the attractiveness
of these locations for manufacturing activity resulting in out-migration by those of
working age and leading to an ageing of the local population.
In Columns (3) and (4) we consider the same specification taking the ratio of
employment to population or the ratio of employment in industry to population as
our left-hand side variable. In each case, employment like population is measured by
place of residence. The employment series are substantially more volatile than the
population series, exhibiting greater cyclical fluctuation and probably more subject
to measurement error. As with the demographics data, employment information is
unavailable for some years.
Nonetheless, in Columns (3) and (4) we find a negative and statistically significant
coeﬃcient on the border×division interaction, implying that division led to a decline in
the ratio of employment to population in border cities relative to other West German
cities. This supports the idea that the economically inactive are less aﬀected by division
because they do not suﬀer the fall in nominal wages driven by reduced market access
and only experience a higher consumer price index due to reduced supplier access. The
results also supply another piece of evidence for which the alternative hypothesis of
fear of further armed conflict does not have a straightforward explanation.
6.4. City Structure
One of the other possible explanations for our findings that we introduced above
related to city structure. Perhaps the treatment and control groups of cities diﬀer
systematically in terms of industry structure, and the industries in which border cities
are specialized are precisely those industries which declined after the Second World
War relative to the pre-war period. This relates to a concern about selection on
observables - that the treatment and control groups of cities diﬀer systematically in
terms of some observed characteristics for which we have not controlled. Table 6
reports descriptive statistics for border and non-border cities. In 1939 immediately
prior to division, treatment cities were on average somewhat larger and less industrial
than control cities, though these diﬀerences are not statistically significant at the 5
percent level.
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To address potential concerns about selection on observables, we now combine our
diﬀerence in diﬀerences methodology with matching. We match each treatment city
within 75 kilometers of the East-West border to a non-border control city as similar
as possible to the treatment city in terms of its observed characteristics. Matching
leads to a dramatic reduction in the sample size as we exclude all non-border cities
which are not matched with a border city. The counterbalancing advantage is that we
compare treatment border cities and control non-border cities that are closer in terms
of their observed characteristics.
In Column (1) of Table 7 we match on population by minimizing the squared
diﬀerence in 1939 population between treatment and control cities. This addresses
the concern that small cities may have systematically diﬀerent economic structures
to large cities. In Column (2) we match on 1939 employment levels which controls
for heterogeneity in the size of the workforce across cities. Column (3) addresses
concerns about industrial structure. We compare treatment and control cities that
are as similar as possible in terms of their employment levels across disaggregated
industries by minimizing the sum of squared diﬀerences in 1939 employment across
28 sectors.25 Therefore, the decline in the relative growth of border cities following
division that is observed in this specification cannot be explained by border cities
systematically specializing in a diﬀerent set of industries whose growth opportunities
change before and after division.
In Column (4) we match on industrial structure and geography, by requiring the
control group of cities to lie within a band 100-175 kilometers from the East-West
border, and minimizing the sum of squared diﬀerences in 1939 employment levels in
the 28 disaggregated sectors. The distance grid cell estimates in Table 2 and the non-
parametric results above suggest that a control group more than 100 kilometers from
the East-West border should not be strongly influenced by the division treatment.
Eliminating cities that are more than 175 kilometers from the border ensures that
the control group is geographically close to the treatment group. This excludes, for
example, the industrial Ruhr region from the control group.
25The sectors are comparable to two-digit ISIC industries. See the Data Appendix for a list of the
sectors. Matching on employment in disaggregated manufacturing industries alone yields a similar
pattern of results.
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Across all four columns of Table 7, we find a negative and highly statistically signif-
icant coeﬃcient on the border×division interaction. This provides powerful evidence
of a strong negative treatment eﬀect of division on border cities after controlling for
variation in city structure and geographical location. The similarity of the estimation
results with and without matching is again consistent with the idea that the drawing
of the border between East and West Germany was driven by military and political
considerations unrelated to pre-existing city characteristics.
6.5. War Devastation
Another of the alternative possible explanations for our findings that we intro-
duced above related to devastation during World War II. We address this concern by
exploiting measures of the extent of destruction compiled in the immediate aftermath
of the war. These are cubic metres of rubble per capita and the number of destroyed
dwellings relative to the 1939 stock of dwellings. Both measures capture devastation
as a result of bombing raids and land combat.
We begin by estimating a cross-section regression of the degree of destruction on
our border dummy, which is equal to one if the city is within 75 kilometers of the
East-West German border. We find that border cities experienced marginally less
destruction, but the diﬀerence is not statistically significant at conventional levels.26
In Column (1) of Table 8 we estimate our baseline specification from Column (1) of
Table 2 but include a full set of interactions between rubble per capita as measured at
the end of the war and year dummies. This specification allows devastation associated
with the Second World War to have diﬀerent eﬀects on city growth rates in diﬀerent
years and places no prior structure on the time period over which these eﬀects operate.
Column (2) re-estimates the same specification interacting our measure of dwellings
destroyed during the war with the year dummies.
For both measures of war destruction, we find no statistically significant correla-
tion with city population growth rates in the pre-war period, suggesting no systematic
relationship between pre-war population growth and the intensity of destruction. The
26The regressions using rubble and destroyed dwellings have 111 and 108 observations respectively
since the data are missing for a few cities. The estimated coeﬃcients (standard errors) are -0.876
(2.213 ) and -8.940 (5.961 ) respectively.
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coeﬃcient on the interaction with the 1960 dummy, which captures the eﬀect on city
population growth between 1950 and 1960, is positive and highly statistically signif-
icant for both measures. This provides evidence that cities which experienced heavy
destruction grew more rapidly in the immediate post-war period as rebuilding took
place. We find no statistically significant correlation between war devastation and
population growth rates during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. This finding is in line with
the results of Davis and Weinstein (2002) and Brakman et al. (2004) that Japanese
and West German cities recovered surprisingly fast from the damage done by Allied
bombing attacks and returned to their pre-war growth trajectories.
Most importantly, the inclusion of these interactions between war destruction and
year dummies has very little impact on the estimated treatment eﬀect of division on
border cities. The treatment remains of the same magnitude and highly statistically
significant, providing strong evidence that our results are not driven by diﬀering levels
of war damage experienced by border and non-border cities.
6.6. Subsidies
After the division of Germany the West German federal government adopted exten-
sive regional policies in an attempt to compensate the regions bordering East Germany
for the disadvantages induced by their new peripheral location. Evaluating the impact
of these policies is diﬃcult. First, funding came from a multitude of sources and of-
ten took the form of tax reductions which makes it diﬃcult to determine the exact
amounts spent and the distribution of the spending within the border region. Sec-
ond, regional policy spending is likely to be highly endogenous with areas that are
particularly hard-hit receiving more support.
To provide some evidence for the eﬀectiveness of the subsidy programme for the
border regions we will exploit two features of these programmes. First, federal funding
for the border region increased continuously over time. Support began in the early
1950s, was formalized in the Regional Development Act (“Raumordnungsgesetz”) in
1965, and expanded with the introduction of the Border Region Support Act (“Zonen-
randförderungsgesetz”) in 1971. This pattern is illustrated in Figure 6 which graphs
total regional policy spending in West Germany in 1970, 1980 and 1990 and in Re-
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unified Germany in 2000. The largest part of the support for the border region along
the East-West German border was classified as regional policy spending and Ziegler
(1992) shows that roughly half of all regional policy spending prior to reunification
was allocated to the East-West border region.27 Second, the border region (“Zonen-
randgebiet”), which qualified for financial support under the Border Region Support
Act, was an area of approximately 40 kilometers width along the East-West border.28
These two properties of the subsidy programme suggest that, if the subsidies were
eﬀective, the relative performance of cities that qualified and failed to qualify for
support under the Border Region Support Act of 1971 should change over time within
the division period. Of the 20 cities in our sample located within 75 kilometers of
the East-West border, 15 qualified for support. To investigate the impact of federal
subsidy programmes, we create a dummy variable (Subsidy) which equals one if a city
is located within 75 kilometers of the border and qualifies for support, and a second
dummy variable (No Subsidy) which equals one if a city is located within 75 kilometers
of the border and does not qualify for support. When included in the regression on
their own, the dummies capture any systematic diﬀerence between population growth
in these cities and other West German cities. We also include interaction terms between
the dummies and division, which capture any systematic change in the population
growth of these cities relative to other West German cities after division.
Column (1) estimates our diﬀerences in diﬀerences specification including both sets
of dummies and interaction terms for the pre-war and division periods. The Subsidy
and No Subsidy dummies themselves are statistically insignificant, consistent with our
earlier finding of no systematic diﬀerence in population growth between West German
border and non-border cities prior to division. The Subsidy×Division interaction is
negatively signed and highly statistically significant, implying that cities that qualified
for support saw their population growth decline after division relative to other West
27 In addition to the federal regional policy programmes, several states had subsidy programmes
targeted at the border region, which were typically much smaller and had a similar focus to the federal
programmes.
28See Bundesminsterium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen (1987) for a detailed overview of the diﬀerent
types of subsidies available under the Border Region Support Act, the exact location of the 40 kilometer
corridor to which this law applied, and also the location of priority areas with increased subsidy rates
within this corridor.
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German cities more than 75 kilometers from the border. The No Subsidy×Division
interaction is negatively signed, but not statistically significant at conventional levels
and approximately half the magnitude of the Subsidy×Division interaction. This is
consistent with the Border Region Support Act successfully targeting those cities most
strongly aﬀected by the loss of Eastern markets due to German division. Cities within
75 kilometers of the East-West border that qualified for support are both closer to the
border and on average smaller than cities within 75 kilometers of the border that did
not qualify.
Column (2) re-estimates the specification from Column (1) restricting the post-war
sample to the period 1950 to 1970, while Column (3) re-estimates the same specifica-
tion restricting the post-war sample to the period 1970 to 1988. In the early of years of
division prior to the enactment of the Border Region Support Act, we find that cities
that subsequently qualified for support under the act experienced more than twice as
large a decline in population growth following division than other cities within 75 kilo-
meters of the border. In contrast, in the later years of division, cities that qualified for
support still experienced a statistically significant decline in their population growth
relative to other West German cities more than 75 kilometers from the border. How-
ever, the estimated eﬀect is now closer to that estimated for cities within 75 kilometers
of the border that failed to qualify for support. While far from conclusive, the change
in the relative fortunes of qualifying and non-qualifying border cities is consistent with
the idea that at least some of the decline in the treatment eﬀect during the division
period is due to enhanced federal regional subsidy programmes for the border region.
7. Reunification
We have so far presented a variety of evidence supporting division’s negative impact
on border cities through market access. We now explore whether reunification reversed
the eﬀects of division. In many ways, reunification is a much smaller experiment. First,
the areas of pre-war Germany that were integrated in 1990 (East and West Germany)
are smaller than the areas that were divided after the war (which also included areas
which are now part of Poland and Russia). Second, East and West Germany had
broadly similar levels of income per capita prior to the Second World War (see for
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example Ritschl 1996). In contrast, in 1990 GDP per capita in West Germany stood
at $23,915 compared to $8,679 in East Germany (Lipschitz and McDonald 1990).
Third, the federal subsidies to the former border region under the Border Region
Support Act were rapidly reduced in the immediate aftermath of reunification and
were entirely phased out by the end of 1994. This trend is also apparent in Figure 6
which shows that between 1990 and 2000 total regional policy spending in Germany
decreased by more than 50 percent.29 The border cities’ increased market access was
therefore at least in part oﬀset by sharply reduced levels of federal funding. This
contrasts with the experience after division when it took until the 1970s for subsidy
programmes to become fully developed. Fourth, even if reunification involved changes
in market access of the same magnitude as division, history may not be reversed if there
are multiple equilibria (σ (1− µ) < 1 in the model). In this case, the temporary shock
of division may have a permanent impact on the spatial distribution of population by
shifting the economy between multiple equilibria.
Nonetheless, although the experiment of reunification is very diﬀerent from that of
division, is there evidence of a reversal of history? To investigate this column (1) of
Table 10 estimates our baseline specification from equation (15) for the division and
reunification periods using annualized rates of population growth for 1950-60, 1960-70,
1970-80, 1980-88 and 1992-2002. The estimated coeﬃcient γ on the border×division
interaction is negative and highly statistically significant, implying that population
growth was slower in border cities relative to non-border cities during the period of
division than after reunification.
While this finding is consistent with an improvement in the relative growth prospects
of border cities following reunification, it is probably not very revealing. This specifica-
tion implicitly assumes that the border cities are in a steady state during the division
period and are then hit by the exogenous reunification shock. However, this assump-
tion is clearly invalid during much of the early division period when the border cities
adjust to the impact of division. To mitigate this problem we restrict the division sam-
ple in Column (2) of Table 10 to the period immediately preceding reunification (the
29Almost all of the large-scale transfers from West Germany to the former East Germany after
reunification were not classified as regional policy spending.
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period 1980-88). This period is more than thirty years after division and we provided
evidence earlier that by this time much of division’s eﬀect had already worked itself
out. With this more plausible, but much shorter, comparison period we again find a
negative coeﬃcient γ on the border×division interaction. However, the estimated coef-
ficient is now substantially smaller in magnitude and no longer statistically significant
at conventional levels.
In Columns (3) and (4) we investigate the prediction of our theoretical model
that the removal of the border should have a larger impact on smaller cities, where
access to other cities’ markets is relatively more important. We again restrict the
division sample to the period immediately preceding reunification and classify a city
as small if its population in 1919 was below the median for that year.30 In Column
(3) we find that the improvement in relative growth prospects following reunification
was stronger for smaller cities. The coeﬃcient on the border×division interaction
approximately doubles relative to that reported in Column (2) but is still not significant
at conventional critical values. In Column (4) we see that there is little change in the
relative growth rates of large border and non-border cities in response to reunification,
consistent with reunification having much less of an eﬀect on these cities’ market access.
Therefore, although the reunification shock is smaller in magnitude and it is hard
to separate its eﬀects from those of division, there is some evidence that the change in
market access following reunification is again beginning to change the relative fortunes
of border and non-border cities.
8. Conclusion
This paper exploits the division of Germany after the Second World War and the
reunification of East and West Germany in 1990 as a natural experiment to provide
evidence of the importance of market access for economic development. Following
division West German cities close to what became the East-West border went from
being at the heart of an integrated Germany to being on the edge of the Western world.
In line with a standard new economic geography model, we show that the border led
30While splitting the sample based on the 1919 population distribution ensures that the split is not
influenced by either division or re-unification, results are very similar if we split the sample based on,
for example, the 1980 population distribution.
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to a sharp decline in population growth in West German cities close to the border
relative to other West German cities.
We provide a variety of pieces of evidence that our results are capturing loss of
access to markets rather than alternative possible explanations such as systematic dif-
ferences in city structure, destruction during the Second World War, or the fear of
further armed conflict. We show that the negative treatment eﬀect of division on bor-
der cities can be completely explained by an empirical measure of market access and is
stronger for smaller cities, exactly as predicted by the theoretical model. Furthermore,
we provide evidence that the burden of division falls disproportionately on the eco-
nomically active, who are aﬀected by both the fall in nominal wages and the rise in the
consumer price index. We demonstrate that our results remain if we combine matching
and diﬀerences in diﬀerences techniques to control for variation in industrial structure.
Finally, our estimates are also robust to controlling for levels of war destruction.
As we focus on a sample of cities which are part of the same country and which had
very similar natural endowments over time, our results cannot easily be explained by
diﬀerences in institutions or natural advantage. This clearly does not imply that these
factors are irrelevant in determining economic development. The experience of East
Germany during the period of division is itself an interesting case study demonstrating
the relevance of institutions. The contribution of this paper is to provide clear evidence
for the importance of market access as a determinant of economic prosperity.
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A Data Appendix
A1. Data Sources
The data on city populations were collected from the statistical yearbooks of pre-
war Germany (“Statistisches Jahrbuch des Deutschen Reiches”) and West Germany
(“Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland”). Information on the
latitude and longitude of West and East German cities was obtained from the Ger-
man Federal Agency for Cartography and Geodesy (“Bundesamt für Kartographie und
Geodäsie”) and the webpage http://www.jewishgen.org/ShtetlSeeker/ for cities which
are now part of Poland and Russia.
Data on employment in each city is available for the pre-war period in the 1925,
1933 and 1939 population census (“Volks-, Berufs- und Betriebszählung”). We use the
“Beschäftigte in der Industrie” as our measure of employment in industry. Intertem-
porally comparable employment data at our level of regional disaggregation for the
post-war period was only available in the 1961, 1970 and 1987 West German popula-
tion census. The city level results of these censuses were published in the Statistical
Yearbook of German Cities (“Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutscher Gemeinden”). We use
the “Beschäftigte im Produzierenden Gewerbe” as our measure of employment in in-
dustry for the post-war period.
In the 1939 population census, total employment is also broken down into 28 dis-
aggregated sectors. The industry classification is comparable to modern two-digit
classifications: Agriculture, Mining, Minerals, Steel, Chemicals, Textiles, Paper, Print,
Leather, Wood, Food, Apparel, Shoes, Construction, Utilities, Business Services, Trans-
port, Restaurants, Public Administration, Education, Clerical, Consulting, Medical,
Veterinary, Cosmetics, Entertainment, Domestic Help, and Other Support Worker.
Information on the share of the population over 65 for all our cites was only available
in the 1933 and 1939 census for the pre-war period. For the post-war this information
was taken from the 1961, 1970 and 1987 West German population census, as reported
in the Statistical Yearbook of German Cities.
Our two measures of war devastation are taken from Kästner (1949), who reports
the results of a survey undertaken by the German Association of Cities (“Deutscher
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Städtetag”), which was published in the Statistical Yearbook of German Cities. Our
two measures of destruction are available for almost all of our cities.
Total federal spending on regional policy (“Regionale Strukturmassnahmen”) in
1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 was taken from Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2003)
and deflated with the Consumer Price Index for West Germany (“Preisindex für die
Lebenshaltung im früheren Bundesgebiet: Alle Privaten Haushalte (1995=100)”). As
this index was discontinued in 1999 we extrapolated it to 2000 with the change in the
consumer price index for Germany in its current boundaries.
A2. City Aggregations
As discussed in the Section on data description, we aggregate cities which merge
between 1919 and 2002 for all years in our sample, and we also aggregate any settlement
with a population greater than 10,000 in 1919 that merges with one of our cities for
all years in the sample. The following list reports for each city in our dataset the cities
or settlements that it has absorbed and the years in which the merger occurred.
Bergisch Gladbach 1975 absorbed Bensberg
Beuthen 1927 absorbed Rossberg
Bochum 1929 absorbed Langendreer and Linden-Dahlhausen
1975 absorbed Wattenscheid
Bonn 1969 absorbed Bad Godesberg
Bremerhaven 1939 absorbed Wesermünde
(Wesermünde is itself the result of a merger between
Geestemünde and Lehe in 1924)
Dortmund 1928 absorbed Hörde
Düsseldorf 1929 absorbed Benrath
Duisburg 1929 absorbed Hamborn
1975 absorbed Homberg, Rheinhausen and Walsum
Essen 1929 absorbed Katernberg, Kray and Steele
Frankfurt am Main 1928 absorbed Höchst
Gelsenkirchen 1924 absorbed Rotthausen
1928 absorbed Buer and Horst (Emscher)
Hagen 1929 absorbed Haspe
Hamburg 1938 absorbed Altona, Wandsbek and Harburg-Wilhelmsburg
(Harburg-Wilhelmsburg were themselves separate cities until 1927)
Hannover 1920 absorbed Linden
Herne 1975 absorbed Wanne-Eickel
(Wanne and Eickel were themselves separate cities until 1926)
The Costs of Remoteness 42
Hindenburg 1927 absorbed Zaborze
Köln 1975 absorbed Rodenkirchen and Porz
Mönchengladbach 1975 absorbed Rheydt
(Rheydt itself merged in 1929 with Odenkirchen)
Oberhausen 1929 absorbed Sterkrade and Osterfeld
Potsdam 1939 absorbed Nowawes
Solingen 1929 absorbed Ohligs and Wald
Wiesbaden 1926 absorbed Biebrich
Wilhelmshaven 1937 absorbed Rüstringen
Zwickau 1944 absorbed Planitz
We also record all city-year observations in which a city reports a merger with a
settlement whose population we are unable to track and the city’s population series is
visibly aﬀected. This information was taken from http://de.wikipedia.org/ and each
city’s oﬃcial webpage.
B Calibration Appendix
In line with the estimates in Feenstra (1994), we assume that the elasticity of
substitution between manufacturing varieties (σ) is four. We set the share of housing
in consumer expenditure (1 − µ) equal to one third. The fixed cost (F ) rescales the
number of manufacturing varieties and, without loss of generality, we set it equal to
one.
Following the literature on the gravity equation in international trade, we model
bilateral transport costs as a constant elasticity function of distance: Tci = dist
φ
ci,
where φ > 0. The coeﬃcient φ is not generally estimated in the gravity equation
literature, since bilateral trade flows in the CES expenditure system depend on T 1−σci =
distφ(1−σ)ci , and so the estimated coeﬃcient on distance is φ(1−σ), which based on the
estimates in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Redding and Venables (2004) we
set equal to −1. For our assumed value of the elasticity of substitution (σ = 4), the
implied value of φ is one third.
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Map 1 – Germany in its pre - World War II borders
Notes: The map shows Germany in its pre - World War II borders  (usually referred to as the 1937 borders) and the division of Germany into an 
area that became part of Russia, an area that became part of Poland, East Germany and West Germany. The West German cities in our sample 
which are within 75 kilometers of the German-German border are denoted by squares, all other cities by circles.
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Figure 3: Indices of Border & Non−Border City Population
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Figure 6: West German Regional Subsidies
Bamberg Hannover
Bayreuth Hildesheim
Braunschweig       Hof
Celle Kassel
Coburg Kiel
Erlangen Lübeck
Fulda Lüneberg
Göttingen Neumünster
Goslar Schweinfurt
Hamburg Würzburg
Notes: The treatment group of twenty West German cities 
that lie within 75 kilometer of the former border between 
East and West Germany.
Table 1 -  Treatment Group of Border Cities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Population 
Growth
Population 
Growth
Population 
Growth
Population 
Growth
Population 
Growth
Border × Division      -0.746***      -0.746***     -0.746***
(0.182) (0.183) (0.196)
Border × Year 1950-60      -1.249***
(0.348)
Border × Year 1960-70    -0.699**
(0.283)
Border × Year 1970-80  -0.640*
(0.355)
Border × Year 1980-88      -0.397***
(0.147)
Border 0-25km × Division      -0.702***
(0.257)
Border 25-50km × Division     -0.783***
(0.189)
Border 50-75km × Division  -0.620*
(0.374)
Border 75-100km × Division 0.399
(0.341)
Border 0.129 0.129   0.325*
(0.139) (0.139) (0.187)
Border 0-25km -0.110
(0.185)
Border 25-50km 0.144
(0.170)
Border 50-75km 0.289
(0.272)
Border 75-100km  -0.299*
(0.160)
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State ("Länder") Effects Yes
City Effects Yes
Observations 833 833 833 833 833
R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.32
Notes: Data are a panel of 119 West German cities. The left-hand side variable is the annualized rate of growth of city 
population, expressed as a percentage. Population growth rates are for 1919-25, 1925-33, 1933-39, 1950-60, 1960-70, 
1970-80 and 1980-88. Border is a dummy which is 0 unless a city lies within 75 kilometers of the former border 
between East and West Germany in which case it takes the value 1. Division is a dummy which is 0 except for the years 
1950-88 when German was divided in which case it takes the value 1. Border 0-25km is a dummy which is 0 unless a 
city lies within 25 kilometers of the East-West border in which case it takes the value 1. Standard errors are 
heteroscedasticity robust and adjusted for clustering on city. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes 
significance at the 5% level; *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Table 2 - Baseline Empirical Results
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Population 
Growth
Population 
Aged Over 65 
(Percent)
Share of Total 
Employment 
in Population 
(Pecent)
Share of Ind. 
Employment 
in Population 
(Percent)
Border × Division      -1.014***     0.785**    -1.101**    -1.170**
(0.232) (0.327) (0.439) (0.507)
Border     0.327**       1.204*** 0.519 -1.737 
(0.164) (0.242) (0.646) (1.124)
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 595 595 714 714
R-squared 0.15 0.89 0.49 0.28
Notes: Right-hand side variables are defined as in Table 2. Column (1) repeats the basic specification from 
Table 2 for the sample for which demographic structure data are available, which are the years 1933, 1939, 
1961, 1970 and 1987. Employment data are available for these years and for 1925, which accounts for the 
larger number of observations in Columns (3) and (4). Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and 
adjusted for clustering on city. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% 
level; *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Table 5 - Demographic Structure and Employment
Number of cities Mean City Population in 1939 
Share of industry 
employment in total 
employment in 1939 
Treatment Cities 20 185,490 45.60%
(<75km to the East - West border) (376,092) (8.26) 
Control cities 99 131,235 50.92%
(≥75km to the East - West border) (168,701 ) (13.23)
Table 6 - Characteristics of the Treatment and Control Cities
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Population 
Growth
Population 
Growth
Population 
Growth
Population 
Growth
Border × Division      -0.921***      -1.000***      -0.888***      -0.782***
(0.218) (0.253) (0.247) (0.261)
Border   0.309*     0.338** 0.082 0.061
(0.153) (0.156) (0.167) (0.194)
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matching on Population Total Employment
Employment 
in 28 sectors
Employment 
in 28 sectors 
and geography
Observations 280 280 280 280
R-squared 0.29 0.26 0.38 0.29
Table 7 - Matching
Notes:  Left-hand side and right-hand side variables are defined as in Table 2. The years included 
are the same as in Table 2. In Column (1) matching is based on minimizing squared 1939 
population differences between treatment and control cities. In Column (2) matching is based on 
minimizing squared 1939 employment differences between treatment and control cities. In Column 
(3) matching is based on minimizing the sum of squared 1939 employment differences in 28 
sectors. In Column (4) matching is based on minimizing the sum of squared 1939 employment 
differences in 28 sectors and requiring the control city to lie within 100-175 kilometers from the 
East-West German border. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and adjusted for clustering 
on city. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; *** 
denotes significance at the 1% level.
(1) (2)
Population 
Growth
Population 
Growth
Border × Division      -0.737***      -0.656***
(0.182) (0.191)
Border 0.136 0.129
(0.139) (0.146)
War Devastation × Year 1919-25 -0.014 -0.004 
(0.011) (0.006)
War Devastation × Year 1925-33 0.019 0.006
(0.017) (0.007)
War Devastation × Year 1933-39 -0.001 0.004
(0.023) (0.009)
War Devastation × Year 1950-60      0.073***      0.033***
(0.015) (0.008)
War Devastation × Year 1960-70 0.012 0.009
(0.017) (0.007)
War Devastation × Year 1970-80 -0.014 0.004
(0.025) (0.012)
War Devastation × Year 1980-88 0.007 0.002
(0.013) (0.006)
Year Effects Yes Yes
Observations 777 756
R-squared 0.24 0.24
Notes: Left-hand side and right-hand variables are defined as in Table 2 except for 
War Devastation. The years included are the same as in Table 2. In Column (1) War 
Devastation is measured as rubble per capita, expressed as cubic metres per capita. 
In Column (2) War Devastation is the number of destroyed dwellings as a percentage 
of the 1939 stock of dwellings. The war devastation variables are missing for a few 
cities which accounts for the smaller number of observations than in Table 2.  
Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and adjusted for clustering on city. * 
denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; *** 
denotes significance at the 1% level.
Table 8 - War Devastation
(1) (2) (3)
Population 
Growth
Population 
Growth
Population 
Growth
Subsidy × Division      -0.851***      -1.137***    -0.565**
(0.179) (0.221) (0.225)
No Subsidy × Division
-0.432 -0.487 -0.377 
(0.374) (0.604) (0.244)
Subsidy 0.104 0.104 0.104
(0.141) (0.141) (0.141)
No Subsidy 0.203 0.203 0.203
(0.302) (0.302) (0.302)
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Sample 1919-1939 & 1950-1988
1919-1939 & 
1950-1970
1919-1939 & 
1970-1988
Observations 833 595 595
R-squared 0.21 0.10 0.21
Notes: Left-hand and right-hand side variables defined as in Table 2, except 
Subsidy is a dummy variable which equals one if a city is located within 75 
kilometers of the border and qualifies for support under the Border Region Support 
Act 1971, and No Subsidy is a dummy variable which equals one if a city is located 
within 75 kilometers of the border and does not qualify for support under the Border 
Region Support Act. In Column (2) the division sample is restricted to the years 
1950-70. In Column (3) the division sample is restricted to the years 1970-88. 
Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and adjusted for clustering on city. * 
denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; *** 
denotes significance at the 1% level.
Table 9 - Subsidies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Population 
Growth
Population 
Growth
Population 
Growth
Population 
Growth
Border × Division      -0.477*** -0.127 -0.223 -0.007 
(0.156) (0.128) (0.202) (0.136)
Border -0.141 -0.141 -0.236 -0.064 
(0.106) (0.106) (0.168) (0.108)
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
City Sample All All Small Cities Large Cities
Year Sample 1950-1988 & 1992-2002 
1980-1988 & 
1992-2002 
1980-1988 & 
1992-2002
1980-1988 & 
1992-2002
Observations 595 238 120 118
R-squared 0.30 0.15 0.21 0.14
Table 10 - Reunification
Notes: Left and right-hand side variables are defined as in Table 2. In Column (1) population growth 
rates are for 1950-60, 1960-70, 1970-80, 1980-88, and 1992-2002. In Columns (2) to (4) population 
growth rates are for 1980-88 and 1992-2002. Column (3) reports results for small cities defined as 
those with a 1919 population below the median. Column (4) reports results for large cities defined as 
those with a 1919 population greater than or equal to the median. Standard errors are 
heteroscedasticity robust and adjusted for clustering on city. * denotes significance at the 10% level; 
** denotes significance at the 5% level; *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
